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THE DOMAINS OF LOYALTY: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION

DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
ABSTRACT
Recent scholarly inquiry into fiduciary law predominantly focuses
on whether the subject is a coherent field and not a piecemeal
assortment of doctrinal detail. This Article looks to the future and to
relationships between the formal domain of fiduciary law and other
factors that shape conduct. These include intrinsic motivation,
markets for professional services, and forces like the operation of
reputation. The Article demonstrates that looking across domains,
from the legal to the extralegal, casts in sharp relief the reasons why
fiduciary law is distinctive. These stem from the specific qualities of
relationships to which fiduciary law applies, as well as the mandatory nature of the distinctively fiduciary duty of loyalty that backstops parties who rely on the trustworthiness of others.
The Article also engages with implications to be drawn from
extensive behavioral research on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
The Article argues that fiduciary law can operate to reinforce loyal
conduct motivated by nonlegal factors by “crowding in” loyalty, not
crowding it out. Elaborating further, the Article uses concrete
examples to examine how factors beyond the law that shape conduct
likely vary in significance along dimensions of variation among
fiduciary relationships.

* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University. For comments over time that
greatly helped with this Article, I thank Tamar Frankel, Mitu Gulati, and Arthur Laby, as
well as Ethan Leib and the other participants in the Editorial Conference for this Symposium.
Thanks as well to Michael McArthur of the Goodson Library, Duke Law School, for help with
sources, and the William & Mary Law Review’s editors for their resourceful work.
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INTRODUCTION
By imposing an obligation of loyalty, does fiduciary law undercut
or “crowd out” the force of intrinsic motivation to act loyally?
Alternatively, does fiduciary law reinforce or enhance intrinsic motivation, including a disposition to trust another person to act loyally?
Are the relationships between the law and intrinsic motivation
antagonistic, or complementary and mutually reinforcing? Looking
to future developments in fiduciary law and theory, this Article
explores these relationships. This inquiry implicates the power of
extralegal norms and reputational concerns to reinforce loyalty and
deter or sanction disloyal conduct.
Extensive behavioral research examines many dimensions of
intrinsic motivation. Scholarship exploring the legal implications of
intrinsic motivation addresses fiduciary law but mostly focuses on
implications for contract, property, and tort law, as well as tax
administration, and criminal law and its enforcement. The Article
detangles distinct strands in prior scholarship and identifies the
sharp limitations of “crowding-out” arguments as applied to fiduciary law. To test the implications, the Article introduces three
examples from the fiduciary realm, chosen because they differ along
multiple dimensions and illustrate how these issues might matter
in concrete settings.
Scholars who premise critiques of legal and regulatory interventions on behavioral research often assume the superiority of
intrinsic motivation over the duty to comply with legal mandates.
They rely on experimental findings that a person who does what is
right because it is right or otherwise intrinsically satisfying
experiences a “warm glow” that is diminished or eliminated when
obeying a legal mandate to do the same thing.1 Another strand of
scholarship emphasizes that complying with a legal mandate—
which could originate from a legally enforceable contract between
the parties—may yield fewer gains to reputation than when the
same conduct is not legally compelled.2 The implications of these
accounts can be combined if it is intelligible to say that an actor can
1. See infra text accompanying notes 17-20.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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derive “warm-glow” satisfaction from an enhanced reputation in
others’ eyes or from the prospect of enhanced reputation.3
Relatedly, some scholarship premised on experimental findings
associates legal mandates with decreased interpersonal trust and
willingness to cooperate.4 Separately, to the extent a legal mandate
changes the reason for an action, it can change the meaning an
actor attributes to the action over time, with consequences for the
capacity to define oneself that could prove regrettable.5 Finally,
some accounts may verge on nostalgia for a prelapsarian imaginary
in which interpersonal trust, nonlegal sanctions, and intrinsically
motivated rightful behavior made legal rules and formal institutions
for their enforcement either unnecessary or relatively unimportant.6
Experimental and behavioral research also supports counters to
arguments that rely on “crowding-out” theories. For starters,
research findings show that sometimes the law can “crowd in”
intrinsic motivation—for example, by helping to inculcate loyalty to
interests other than an actor’s own, thus supplementing and not
displacing intrinsic motivation.7 Legal mandates can increase the
willingness to trust others by undergirding the likelihood that
actors who enlist others’ trust will prove worthy of that trust.8
Additionally, arguments that rely on the power of reputation and
3. The concept of amour propre captures this possibility. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP
PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 190 (2011) (defining amour propre as requiring the capacity to
compare oneself with others and as involving “a passion for self-promotion, consisting in a
preference to shine in comparison with others and prompting a desire to attain a position of
superiority, or at least to avoid a position of inferiority”). It “represents the dark side of selfidentification.” Id. A separate question is whether a secure self-image—for example, as a lawabiding or moral person—licenses subsequent conduct that is immoral. This possibility is
beyond the scope of this Article.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
5. See Emad H. Atiq, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal
Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097 (2014). For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying note 140.
6. Scholarship focused on the law merchant and other instances of non-state systems
furnishes an illustration: “To the degree that legal academics are capable of romance, few
theories have conjured more romantic enthusiasm than that of the law merchant, the commercial broker credited for reviving trade in medieval Europe by convening commercial fairs
and forging international trade routes.” BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE 133 (2017).
Admiration for law that “emerges voluntarily and organically with substantive rules tailored
to address pressing problems” sparked projects “to construct commercial law that reflects the
law merchant’s ideal.” Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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assume that actors are unwilling to jeopardize reputation are vulnerable to evidence that reputational sanctions vary in strength,
depending on the stakes and the context.9
More generally, offsetting the lure of “warm-glow” satisfaction
and the intrinsic satisfaction of interpersonal trust is a deeply felt
distaste for feeling like a chump or a dupe once it is evident that
others betrayed the trust reposed in them.10 Separately, “warmglow” accounts do not appear to offset the harm done by betrayal
when it occurs.11 Additionally, law can help allay concerns about the
strength of others’ intrinsic motivation in relationships in which the
risk of betrayal is always at least a theoretical possibility. Law can
stiffen the spine of those in positions of trust when tempted to act
disloyally.12 Triggered as it is by relationships that mostly fall
within legally defined categories, fiduciary law serves a channeling
function—facilitating reliance on actors whose conduct induces
trusting conduct—by furnishing a signal that legally enforceable
duties bind actors who occupy fiduciary roles.13 For actors situated
outside a channel of designation created and reinforced by fiduciary
law and regulation, the absence of such a signal can be a salient
note of caution to prospectively vulnerable parties.14 The significance of signalling in particular contexts creates incentives for
actors seeking to occupy fiduciary roles to do what is required to
enter the channel.15
General scholarly inquiries into fiduciary law predominantly
focus on accrediting the subject as a coherent field and not a
piecemeal assortment of doctrinal detail. Looking to the future
invites reflection on relationships between the formal domain of
fiduciary law and other factors that shape conduct. These include
intrinsic motivation as well as markets for professional services and
forces such as the operation of reputation. The Article demonstrates
9. See infra text accompanying notes 161-68.
10. See infra text accompanying note 51.
11. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1460 (2005) (noting that
scholarship often overlooks adverse consequences of misplaced trust); Claire A. Hill & Erin
Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1720 (2006) (arguing the
overall policy of law should be optimizing, not maximizing trust).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 122-26.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
15. See infra text accompanying note 126.
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that looking across domains, from the legal to the extralegal, casts
in sharp relief the reasons why fiduciary law is distinctive. These
stem from the distinctive qualities of the relationships to which
fiduciary law applies, as well as the mandatory nature of the
distinctively fiduciary duty of loyalty that backstops parties who
rely on the trustworthiness of others. Moreover, fiduciary law can
operate to reinforce loyal conduct motivated by nonlegal factors by
crowding in loyalty, not crowding it out. Using concrete examples,
the Article explores how factors beyond the law that shape conduct
likely vary in significance along dimensions of variation among
fiduciary relationships.
The Article opens by surveying relevant findings from behavioral
research, beginning with studies that identify “crowding-out” effects
when an externally prompted motivation—including compliance
with a legal mandate or a legally enforceable contract—reduces or
eliminates an actor’s intrinsic motivation to perform the same act.
Scholars using the same methodologies also document the presence
of “crowding-in” effects, when the law or other exterior motivation
complements and enhances intrinsic motivation. Behavioral scholarship also engages with trust as a distinct focal point for research,
but how best to define trust remains a contested question. The
Article next turns to implications for fiduciary law. Its distinctive
features, which lend coherence at a general level to a subject
characterized by disparities when viewed at a more granular level,
are invulnerable to critique on crowding-out grounds, even taking
into account a backdrop of extralegal sanctions, including reputational effects.
To explore further implications of crowding-out and crowding-in
effects across a variety of relationships, the Article uses three
concrete examples. These are broker-dealers who furnish investment advice to clients, in light of state-by-state variations in
whether fiduciary duties apply; individuals who organize fundraising campaigns with philanthropic objectives; and trustees of
family trusts who act subject to a conflict to which the settlor
consented in structuring the trust. These relationships differ along
several dimensions, including the presence or absence of prior ties
linking the parties that are consistent with the presence of strong
pulls toward intrinsic motivation; the economic stakes of the
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relationship for its more vulnerable party; and the nature of the role
assumed by the person in whom the vulnerable party must repose
trust. Examining these examples confirms the significance of fiduciary law as a constraint on conduct, as well as its capacity to signal
expectations to parties in fiduciary relationships, in which (one way
or another) one party “has to” trust the other to act loyally and is
thereby always subject to risks of betrayal.
I. CROWDING-OUT AND CROWDING-IN: BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE AND
THEORIES
Unsurprisingly, research into motivation that underpins
crowding-out and crowding-in assessments of legal doctrine and
institutions has multiple components. This Part surveys behavioral
research exploring relationships between intrinsic motivation and
motivations stemming from extrinsic interventions, including the
law, beginning with studies that find these extrinsic interventions
have crowding-out effects. This Part also surveys studies that find
that the law and other sources of external motivation can crowd in
intrinsic motivation. Finally, the Part discusses scholarship
contesting the assumption that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are completely separable, not complementary. A distinct but related
component of this body of scholarship focuses on trust—however
defined—and how it may be undermined or reinforced, including
through the design of complex contracts.
A. Intention, Motivation, and Crowding-Out Effects
Accounts of motivation distinguish it from intention, whether
explicitly or implicitly. As Stephen Galoob and Ethan Leib define
these terms, to inquire into an actor’s intention is to ask what the
actor was trying to do; to inquire into motivation is to ask why.16 In
turn, scholarship premised on behavioral research distinguishes
intrinsic motivation from externally prompted reasons for acting (or
16. Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Motives and Fiduciary Loyalty, 65 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 41, 43 (2020). More formally, an intention is “an executive attitude toward a plan”

constituting the content of the plan; a motivation is “an appraisal of how an intention connects
with action.” Id.
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not acting) in a particular manner. In Bruno Frey’s influential
formulation, intrinsic motivation acknowledges the fact that “people
undertake many activities simply because they like them”; when an
action is intrinsically motivated, the actor receives no apparent
reward except the pleasure or satisfaction of engaging in the activity
itself.17 In contrast, extrinsic motivation is “induced from outside”
and encompasses legal commands and regulations.18 In laboratory
experiments, Frey’s research found that promises of higher
monetary compensation can “crowd out” inner motivations for
performance in some circumstances.19 Frey does not associate
crowding-out effects with “abstract interactions,” such as those
effected via electronic stock exchanges or, in a retail context,
“paying for bread in the supermarket”; instead, crowding-out effects
typify less “abstract” markets for labor and many goods.20
Other scholarship focuses on the relationship between legally
enforceable contracts—a salient source of extrinsic motivation—and
interpersonal trust between parties. Using laboratory experiments,
Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan tested and established
the proposition that in the presence of a binding contract, parties
“attribute[d] others’ cooperation to the constraints imposed by the
contract” and not to qualities of the individuals themselves, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of trust between the parties going forward.21 Malhotra and Murnighan conclude that binding contracts
and trust function as substitutes for each other.22 Nonbinding
contracts, in contrast, permit more attribution of cooperative
conduct to the disposition of the individuals involved as opposed to
externally imposed constraints introduced by a binding contract.23
As developed later in this Section, definitions of “trust” vary; for
these authors, trust “refer[s] to the reduction of uncertainty (or the
management of risk) via informal structures.”24 They define trust

17. BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY, at ix (1997).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at x.
21. Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal
Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534, 534, 553 (2002).
22. See id. at 547.
23. Id. at 552.
24. Id. at 536.
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“as a psychological state of the individual, comprising positive
attributions about another’s behavior that is subject to influence by
formal structures in a relational context.”25 Writing in the same
vein, Eileen Chou and her coauthors conducted a mix of laboratory
and field studies, finding that the presence of a contract leads
parties to anticipate more contentious interactions and to reduce
their cooperative behavior.26 By suggesting a contract, a party
signals low expectations for a relationship, hindering the development of a cooperative relationship; parties whose preference is to
initiate contracts tend to overestimate the efficacy both of surveillance of their contractual partners as well as sanctions to deter
breach.27
Reputation is also a distinct focal point for behavioral research,
in particular to test whether reputational rewards for conduct are
stronger when the conduct is not mandated by law or regulation,
relative to the reputational penalties triggered by not doing what is
required by a mandate. Beginning with the insight that a legal
mandate changes the signal sent by conduct when an actor subject
to the mandate obeys it, Hajin Kim observes that reputational
rewards and penalties may be asymmetric.28 Actors who disobey the
law look especially bad and thereby inflict a loss on their reputation,
but complying with the law may not result in symmetrical gains to
reputation.29 Thus, an asymmetry in reputational effects suggests
that a legal mandate could backfire via a net reduction in reputational rewards for the same conduct when done voluntarily.30
Kim’s laboratory studies tested these effects as applied to corporate
social responsibility (CSR) to assess the effectiveness of legally
binding CSR mandates compared to legal approaches that permit
but do not require pro-social conduct.31 Kim found that the force of
25. Id.
26. Eileen Chou, Nir Halevy & J. Keith Murnighan, The Hidden Cost of Contracts on
Relationships and Performance 11 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1612376 [https://perma.cc/BW2V-79MX].
27. See id.
28. Hajin Kim, The Benefits of Allowing, Rather than Mandating, Corporate Social
Responsibility 31 (Dec. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the William & Mary
Law Review).
29. See id. at 31-32.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 47.
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the legal mandate does not compensate for the reduced reputational
rewards otherwise generated by the permissive regime.32 Additionally, when Kim placed her subjects in the role of corporate managers
making purchasing decisions, they reduced their pro-social behavior
once they were told the CSR mandate was unenforceable but did so
less than subjects who attributed their decisions to the mandate.33
B. Crowding-In and Complementarity Effects
Scholars using behavioral methodologies also document the
presence of “crowding-in” effects that stem from extrinsic motivation
under some circumstances. Frey found that crowding in through an
external intervention—such as the law—can follow when the intervention is perceived to be supportive of intrinsic motivation.34 The
message an external motivation implies matters, and the strength
with which it acknowledges intrinsic motivation particularly
matters.35 As other scholarship establishes, the use of moral
language can serve as a mechanism toward crowding in intrinsic
motivation.36 Additionally, Frey acknowledges the complexity of
motivation; an actor may have multiple motives that mix intrinsic
with extrinsic motivation.37
Iris Bohnet and her coauthors found differences among small and
large groups: Within small groups that interact frequently, reputation matters to the extent that cooperation can be maintained even
in the absence of intrinsic motivation to cooperate.38 In contrast,
larger groups need institutions such as the law “to facilitate efficient
outcomes.”39 Introducing empirical evidence of the long-run effect of
legal rules and institutions on behavior, these authors found that
32. Id.
33. Id. at 49-51.
34. FREY, supra note 17, at 33.
35. Id.
36. Id. “Moral priming,” in particular the use of moral language, can crowd in intrinsic
motivation, especially among people who internalized moral norms and are inclined to act on
them. See Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 137, 148 (2014).
37. FREY, supra note 17, at 14.
38. Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 131 (2001).
39. Id.
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law may not only create incentives but also influence preferences,
a finding that links intrinsic motivation to extrinsic motivation in
a causal sequence.40 Moreover, “crowding-in” and “crowding-out”
effects are not constant over time but can change.41 In particular,
crowding out is associated with low levels of legal enforcement,
which leads parties who are first movers in a sequence of proposed
transactions or other interactions to be extremely cautious.42
Stronger levels of enforcement can signal to a first mover that the
other party is trustworthy.43 Crowding-out effects follow when
enforcement levels are not high enough to deter breach by second
movers.44 When enforcement is at a medium level, a first mover’s
expected payoff from proceeding can be higher than the payoff from
abstaining out of extreme caution.45 But in the worst legal regimes,
the level of enforcement is high enough to induce the first mover to
proceed without sufficient caution; dishonest second movers enjoy
economic success; and the market’s overall share of “dishonest
types” grows.46 Thus, “institutional changes affect behavior,” and by
altering behavior, they affect and shape preferences.47
Likewise focused on the role of law and legal institutions, Samuel
Bowles criticizes the assumption of separability, that is, the
assumption that other-regarding motives are unaffected by policies
that apppeal to economic self-interest.48 In recent experiments, the
separability assumption often fails because incentives can induce
long-term changes in motivations, which would make preferences
endogenous, not exogenous.49 Law is important, Bowles writes,
because “[t]he rule of law and ... institutional designs” not only
“limit the more extreme forms of antisocial behavior,” they “facilitate mutually beneficial interactions beyond the family.”50 By
40. Id. at 142.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 132.
43. See id. at 141.
44. Id. at 132.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136.
47. Id. at 142.
48. Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The
Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1605-06 (2008).
49. Id. at 1607.
50. Id. at 1609.
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providing an assurance of sanctions against those who do not
conform to moral norms, law and legal institutions allay the fear of
“being the sucker who is exploited by defectors” from the norm, a
fear that may be stronger than a non-defector’s wish to cooperate or
comply with the norm.51
Finally, some legal scholarship contests the separability assumption implied in portions of the behavioral scholarship discussed
above, which posits that legally enforceable contracts are categorically distinct from and opposed to (or rivalrous with) informal
agreements.52 Ronald J. Gilson and his coauthors found greater
complexity in relationships between formal and informal contracts.53
This is because agreements that combine “low-powered enforcement” with formal governance structures can complement, not
crowd out, informal mechanisms that rely on increased levels of
trust among parties.54 Their study scrutinized contracts between
parties who “braided,” or intertwined, both formal and informal
elements, a design that allowed parties to assess each other’s
inclinations and capacity to cooperate and respond effectively when
confronted by unforeseen circumstances.55 Formal contractual
governance structures regulated the exchange of nonpublic information without necessarily requiring either party to buy or sell
anything, enabling “collaborative innovation in a world of heightened uncertainty.”56 This structure—a technique that can build both
trust and problem-solving capacity—is beyond the ambit of conventional contract theory, which posits a binary opposition between
legally enforceable formal contracts and a realm of informal
enforcement reliant on reputation and intrinsic motivation or
character traits in which trust is an endowment of the actors that
formalities would crowd out.57

51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1377, 1379, 1383-84 (2010).
53. Id. at 1386-87.
54. Id. at 1380-81, 1403.
55. Id. at 1382-83.
56. Id. at 1382.
57. See id. at 1379-81.
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Complementarity also typifies the counter-theoretic58 agreements
for merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions that Cathy Hwang
scrutinized.59 Advised by sophisticated lawyers and investment
bankers, the business-savvy parties to M&A agreements frequently
invest effort in drafting elaborate term sheets that articulate
agreed-to business terms for the transaction but are conceded to be
legally nonbinding.60 Other terms in the overall agreement, including confidentiality provisions, are legally enforceable but do not
replicate the content of business terms.61 Term sheets incorporated
in deal agreements become components of what overall looks like a
contract while those terms lack the legal bite of enforceability; the
package enables parties to construct their own relational “ecosystem” for future steps in the same transaction.62 “Faux contracts,”
in Hwang’s terminology, help build trust among the parties to any
particular deal, given the incompleteness of its contractual provisions in light of the complexity of M&A transactions and the
multistage nature of the deal process.63 By engaging in the process
of drafting a contract, the parties (and their representatives)
practice collaboration. The lengthy result can serve as a formal or
substantive nudge to comply with the nonbinding terms.64 Business
terms articulated in term sheets also prove “sticky.”65 Completed in
stages, M&A deals encourage parties to care about their reputation
within that deal’s ecosystem.66 Deal lawyers, by bundling binding
and nonbinding terms in the same document or by making them
interdependent, can “steer” parties at least to take the nonbinding
provisions seriously.67 Outside the relational bubble of a particular
deal’s ecosystem, the deal lawyers Hwang interviewed, although
caring more broadly about their own reputations, did not understand concern with reputation in M&A markets more generally as

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

For this terminology, see id. at 1404-05.
Cathy Hwang, Faux Contracts, 105 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2019).
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1056-57.
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a necessary deterrent to bad behavior by parties.68 But most of the
time, the final legally binding acquisition contract contained business terms substantially similar to the nonbinding contents of the
term sheet.69 Having negotiated those terms and signed the term
sheet, parties tend to act as if those terms have legally binding
effect.70
C. Trust, Trustworthiness, and Trusting Behavior
Definitions of trust vary and so far elude consensus among
scholars, both within and across disciplines. A principal point of
disagreement is whether trust can be compatible with calculatedly
seeking advantage through a relationship with another person in
whom one places trust, as occurs in many fiduciary relationships,
elaborated in the next Section.71 Some definitions of trust turn on
the specifics of an individual’s psychological state.72 Malhotra and
Murnighan, discussed in Section A, acknowledge that an individual’s psychological state attributing positive attributes to another’s
behavior can be influenced by formal structures and is embedded
within a relationship.73 By positing that trust and contract are
rivals, these authors seem to leave little or no room for trust in
contractualized relationships, including those that are multistaged
or otherwise evolve over time.74 Nonetheless, theirs is not the most
sparing definition of trust. For Malhotra and Murnighan, trust
“refer[s] to the reduction of uncertainty (or the management of risk)
via informal structures.”75 In contrast, for the celebrated economist
Oliver Williamson, to speak of “calculated trust” is to indulge in a
“contradiction in terms.”76 Williamson writes that trust and “risk”
68. Id. at 1055 (“[L]awyers, in general, felt that reputation was not entirely irrelevant, but
when push came to shove, a bad reputation did not prevent a player from reentering the
market for a future deal.”).
69. Id. at 1033.
70. Id. at 1029, 1051.
71. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 453, 453, 485-86, 486 n.136 (1993).
72. Malhotra & Murnighan, supra note 21, at 536.
73. Id. at 536.
74. See id. at 538.
75. Id. at 536.
76. Williamson, supra note 71, at 485.
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are incompatible ideas because parties to commercial interactions
who assess each other and then take risks based on their assessments of others’ instrumental interests are not engaging in trusting
behavior.77 Scholars in this tradition define trust in terms that limit
it to affective trust stemming from optimism about others in whom
one places trust and their propensity to act with honorable
motives.78
The conceptual spareness of this line of definition is at odds with
the law as well as the richly developed usage associated with “trust”
and the social understandings it reflects. For example, when I say
that I “trust that” my investment advisor will manage my portfolio
consistently with the terms of our management agreement and will
not self-deal using assets in the account, it is possible that I am
expressing a belief about an attribute possessed by the advisor.
More likely, if I say no more I am making a prediction about the
advisor’s conduct, a prediction in which my confidence is enhanced
by the legal doctrines and regulations applicable to investment
advisors. If my intention is a statement of belief in the advisor’s
intrinsic attributes, it is likely that I would say I “trust in” the
advisor.79 Moreover, a “trust that” statement concerning my investment advisor’s conduct likely reflects more than a prediction and
indicates more than my reliance on the advisor,80 in this context
likely marrying expectation with vulnerability. Given the context in
which I have situated the statement, my expectations about the
advisor’s conduct are heightened because I have institutional routes
toward recourse if they are not met, even if I am not keenly aware
of the specifics.81 As Thomas Gallanis terms it, sometimes—as with
an investment advisor—we have to trust that an actor’s conduct will
not betray or harm us once the relationship is underway, although
those possibilities are always theoretically possible, as are more

77. Id. at 463, 485.
78. E.g., Cross, supra note 11, at 1464.
79. On the distinction between “trust-in” and “trust-that” trust, see Hill & O’Hara, supra
note 11, at 1725-26.
80. On the essential role of trust to fiduciary advisory relationships, see Arthur B. Laby,
Advisors as Fiduciaries, FLA. L. REV. 953, 997 (2020).
81. Thomas P. Gallanis, How Much Trust Do Trusts Require?, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST
316, 317 (Paul B. Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020).
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mundane departures from what is required or expected of a person
in a role assumed by a particular actor.82
More robustly defined, trust can be positioned in a relationship to
law that is not rivalrous. Law can enable action “as-if ” another
person—such as an investment advisor—is in fact trustworthy.83 Or,
as Frank Cross explains, law can operate as a “form of hedging”
against misplaced trust.84 Fiduciary law in particular can help to
allay doubts about another’s trustworthiness harbored by a person
who reposes trust.85 Likewise, design choices about transactional
structures can create their own sort of hedges.86 As the studies of
complex contracting discussed in the preceding Section demonstrate, in some settings parties design deal structures that create
opportunities to learn about each other.87 Experience within deal
structures can help inculcate more trust in another party or can
reveal that placing more trust in that party could be unwarranted.88
Trust (or distrust), in short, does not always or necessarily stem
from a prior attitudinal endowment that parties bring to an
interaction or relationship.89 In some contexts trust in others is
learned through experience; it is not necessarily innate to individual
actors.90
Moving outside the realm of bilateral contracting between savvy
deal partners, attitudinal trust is a trait that can be induced by
actors who seek clients or other beneficiaries of services within the
category of “have to trust” relationships.91 Prospective recipients of
trust often seek to generate trusting relationships, taking steps to
engender and invite trust from others.92 The reality of induced
trust—in particular to enable the formation of relationships in
which betrayal is always a possibility—does not appear to be a focal
82. See id. at 317-18.
83. For further elaboration, see infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
84. Cross, supra note 11, at 1466.
85. See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 11, at 1759-60.
86. See Gilson et al., supra note 52, at 1382.
87. Id. at 1385.
88. See Hwang, supra note 59, at 1062-63.
89. See Gilson et al., supra note 52, at 1383-84.
90. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1766-67 (2001).
91. See Laby, supra note 80, at 997; Gallanis, supra note 81, at 317-18.
92. Laby, supra note 80, at 997.
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point of the behavioral scholarship on trust discussed above. This
omission distances that scholarship from a significant part of the
context for fiduciary law and regulation.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR FIDUCIARY LAW
The distinctiveness of the relationships to which fiduciary law
applies explains why crowding-out effects do not support critiques
of fiduciary doctrine and remedies. To be sure, intrinsic motivation
is relevant to compliance with the law in general.93 A felt obligation
to obey the law matters to legal compliance, as does the influence of
social values on individuals’ decisions along with the perception that
the law and legal regime in question are legitimate.94 Additionally,
crowding-out effects may be more salient in rationalizing the structure of doctrine in other fields of law, in particular property law and
tort law.95 Among the reasons Robert Ellickson gives for the limited
affirmative duties owed by property owners is the concern that
legally imposed affirmative duties may reduce intrinsic motivations
to do the same thing.96 Imposing a duty may generate disappointing
outcomes: if the objective is to increase cost-sharing between
neighbors, “requiring an abutting owner to contribute to the costs
of a party wall might” not accomplish much toward the broader costsharing objective if, once imposed, the requirement overall has the
effect of reducing cooperative conduct.97 Separately, the affirmative
duties of care imposed by contemporary tort law do not include a
general duty to rescue another from risks not created by the actor
in question.98 Although the absence of a general duty to rescue in
almost all jurisdictions in the United States has long attracted
criticism,99 its defenders justify the absence of a duty to rescue in
93. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (2006).
94. Id. at 57, 178.
95. Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom
Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 51 (2014).
96. Id.; see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 41-42 (2018)
(situating Ellickson’s treatment of affirmative obligations within welfarist analyses that
disregard the significance and implications of membership in a community).
97. See Ellickson, supra note 95, at 51.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 37 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
99. Id. cmt. e, reporters’ note e. Comment e acknowledges that if the law conveys the
message that it condones failure to rescue persons in mortal peril when an actor could do so
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part by arguing that imposing a duty could stifle altruistic attempts
at rescue.100 In contrast, much about fiduciary law reflects the
circumstances under which it applies, which involve “have to trust”
relationships in which the trusted party voluntarily undertakes a
particular role.101
This Part delineates those circumstances and the distinctive
functions served by fiduciary law, opening with an acknowledgment
that fiduciary law itself spans relationships and discrete bodies of
legal doctrine that vary significantly.102 Relationships to which
fiduciary law applies are often ones in which revelations of disloyal
conduct may provoke extralegal sanctions, a possibility that bears
on fiduciary law’s distinctive functions. The Part closes by examining the unsettled question of whether a fiduciary’s subjective
motivation does or should matter to the law.
A. The Distinctiveness of Fiduciary Relationships and
Fiduciary Law
Fiduciary relationships pose challenges for systematic or
theoretical accounts that aim to reduce them to essential elements
or necessary properties. Synthesizing is difficult, given “[t]he
safely and at little cost, the consequence is “a proposition that is morally repugnant.” Id.
100. David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 703 (2006). Hyman’s empirical study concluded that more lives
are lost through failed attempts to rescue than in proven cases of non-rescue. Id. at 668. Most
likely, people attempt rescue even when it is risky out of “hard-wired altruism”; Hyman
doubts whether the scorn and public shaming to which identified non-rescuers can be
subjected are likely factors in explaining whether particular rescues are attempted. Id. at 70304.
101. See, e.g., Laby, supra note 80, at 997.
102. Fiduciary law is not the only body of legal doctrine with this characteristic. For some
scholars, tort doctrine is a collection of causes of action and associated doctrines, each with
distinctive rationales and justifications. In one recent characterization, “it would be an
overstatement to say that tort law is governed by a set of goals or guiding principles.” GEORGE
C. CHRISTIE, JOSEPH SANDERS, W. JONATHAN CARDI & MARY J. DAVIS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (6th ed. 2019). Of course tort law occupies a secure place, not just
among required law school courses but in the practice of many lawyers and as a subject of
scholarly inquiry. It is a “proper title in the law,” with a settled place on a metaphorical
bookshelf of law books. For the history of the “proper title” metaphor and its argumentative
force, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Contours and Composition of Agency Doctrine: Perspectives
from the History and Theory on Inherent Agency Power, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1813, 1817-19,
1832. A newer entrant on the metaphorical shelf of “proper titles,” fiduciary law’s place is less
assured.
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incredible heterogeneity of fiduciary relationships.”103 These include
relationships in some well-settled categories in which an actor’s
status triggers the imposition of fiduciary obligations (agents,
trustees, and corporate directors) as well as non-categorical
instances in which a court imposes fiduciary obligations on a
particular actor based on the facts of a relationship.104 Nonetheless,
some unifying points of commonality are evident despite variations
in relational specifics.105 A unifying characteristic of fiduciaries is
the duty of loyalty they owe to the beneficiary of the relationship,
which characteristically grounds liability on a conflict between the
beneficiary’s interest and the self-interest of the fiduciary, or a
conflict between duties the same fiduciary owes to multiple
beneficiaries.106 Examined more closely, what duties of loyalty
require varies across types of fiduciaries.107 A trustee must act in the
beneficiary’s sole interest, a stringent obligation reinforced by a “no
further inquiry rule” that makes certain conflicted transactions
voidable by the beneficiary unless the trust’s settlor authorized the
conflict.108 In contrast, transactions with a corporation to which a
director is a party may proceed, without judicial scrutiny of their
merits, when disinterested directors (or a committee of disinterested
103. Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 367, 367 (Evan J. Criddle et al. ed., 2019) [hereinafter OXFORD
HANDBOOK].
104. Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 3.
105. Miller, supra note 103, at 367-68. For a recent example in the investment advisory
context, see Bamford v. Penfold L.P., No. 2019-6005-JTL, 2020 WL 967942 at *8-10 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 28, 2020) (holding that allegations in complaint stated claim for breach of fiduciary duty
owed to plaintiff by longtime friend and financial advisor; although uncommon in Delaware
cases as a basis for a fiduciary-duty claim, a “person-to-person” fiduciary relationship can
stem from a defendant’s role as a financial advisor coupled with unrestricted access to another
person’s confidential information, superior knowledge, and a degree of intimacy comparable
to a familiar relationship).
106. Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note
103, at 385 [hereinafter Gold, Duty of Loyalty]. Another source of variation is the difference
between internal and external constraints on a fiduciary’s loyalty. In particular, some limits
stem from internal facets of the fiduciary’s relationship with the beneficiary, including an
agent-type fiduciary’s duty to obey instructions received from the beneficiary (or principal),
or a constraint implicit in the fiduciary’s role, such as a lawyer’s relationships to the rule of
law and legal institutions. See Andrew S. Gold, The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty, 65
AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 65, 65-66 (2020) [hereinafter Gold, Internal Limits].
107. Gold, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 106, at 386.
108. Id. at 388.
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directors) approve the transaction, at least under many circumstances.109 But neither the possibility of a settlor’s consent to a
conflict nor disinterested directors’ approval of a conflicted transaction obviates the duty of loyalty in general or in terms that sweep
across an entire fiduciary relationship.110 The duty abides, a point
further explored in Part III.C in the context of trusts law.
One commonality among fiduciaries and fiduciary law is that, as
Arthur Laby explains, a breach of fiduciary duty is weightier than
a breach of contract or tort liability stemming from professional
negligence or malpractice.111 A breach of fiduciary duty supports a
cause of action with distinct elements that is separate from a tort
or breach of contract claim.112 In Laby’s characterization, “stronger
and more flexible” remedies are available to successful claimants,
even those unable to prove loss or harm.113 A defendant’s fiduciary
status can also open a gateway to legal theories that regulators or
third parties may assert, including liability based on insider trading
in securities.114 Complementing and accentuating these practical
stakes, breaches of fiduciary duty have attracted a distinct and
morally charged vocabulary.115 Nouns connoting moral condemnation such as “disloyalty,” “betrayal,” “sabotage,” and “abandonment,” are inapposite when a party’s breach of duty amounts only
to negligence or breach of contract.116 Consistent with theories of
“crowding-in” effects explored above, the distinct legal vocabulary
tied to fiduciary obligation, by expressing moral disapproval of an
actor’s conduct, furnishes formal reinforcement for intrinsic motivation both to disapprove of a disloyal actor and to avoid engaging in the conduct.117
Notwithstanding variations across types of fiduciaries and
specifics of the duties they owe, the underlying character of fiduciary law—a fundamental point of coherence across the field—is
Id.
See id.
Laby, supra note 80, at 962.
Id. at 961-62.
Id. at 962. For a catalog of remedies, see Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 449.
114. Laby, supra note 80, at 963.
115. See Gold, Internal Limits, supra note 106, at 75.
116. See id.
117. Gold, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 106, at 385, 393-94.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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obligational in a distinctive fashion.118 That is, although conduct
that would otherwise breach a fiduciary’s duties may be amenable
to consent under some circumstances, fiduciary law in Joshua
Getzler’s formulation consists of “mandatory terms forming pre-set
categories of right and duty, excluding unauthorised interference
with assets and reaching to bind third parties.”119 A fiduciary
assumes that role voluntarily, but the defining content of fiduciary
law is mandatory, a characteristic present in duties of loyalty owed
by fiduciaries in otherwise disparate categories.120
Functional consequences follow from the mandatory or obligational quality of fiduciary law. To some extent, these echo
functional consequences of the formal requirement of consideration
in contract law, delineated by Lon Fuller.121 In addition to an
evidentiary function conventionally associated with the consideration requirement, Fuller discerned two additional and distinct
functions of consideration and other legal formalities: the consideration requirement serves both cautionary and channeling functions.122 Through its cautionary function it “act[s] as a check against
inconsiderate action.”123 Through its channeling function it serves
“to mark or signalize ... enforceable promise[s].”124 To be sure,
fiduciary relationships vary in whether the law imposes formal
requirements; an agent-principal relationship may be formed without a contract, let alone a written instrument.125 However, fiduciary
law “signalizes” that an actor has assumed a particular role with
mandatory duties. If a particular actor is outside a fiduciary “channel,” especially one in which fiduciary duties are further defined by
regulation, the signal conveyed to a prospective client or other
beneficiary invited to trust that actor is negative, or cautionary in
118. Joshua Getzler, “As If.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973,
975 (2011).
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799-802 (1941).
122. Id. at 800-01.
123. Id. at 800.
124. Id. at 801.
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2006). In some
circumstances, “the law [may] require[ ] a writing or record signed by the principal to evidence
an agent’s authority to bind [the] principal to a contract or other transaction,” typically one
that requires a signed writing or record by the party to be charged. Id. § 3.02.
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Fuller’s terminology. Fiduciary law’s channeling and cautionary
functions also serve actors who might undertake fiduciary roles by
indicating, or signalizing, what the law will require. In particular,
fiduciary law (and regulation) carries distinct value in clarifying
what an actor in a fiduciary role should do—for example, by
specifying the kinds of facts or other material that should be
disclosed to a beneficiary.126 The force of the channelling or signalizing function of fiduciary law likely forms the premise for recent
print advertisements from the financial firm, Charles Schwab & Co.,
that ask, “Is your financial advisor a fiduciary?”127
Fiduciary law overall is adapted to, and enabling of, fiduciary
relationships. Despite their heterogeneity, an inherent property of
fiduciary relationships is, in Henry Smith’s summary, that they
present “more than the usual danger of opportunism.”128 The danger
of misbehavior by a fiduciary—stemming from entrusting by the
beneficiary and the consequent vulnerability inherent to the relationship—is heightened by difficulties in monitoring the relationship.129 Results the fiduciary achieves may be hard to measure,
while the means used to achieve them can elude both measurement
and observation.130
Moreover, for many fiduciary relationships, moving toward closer
monitoring and measurement could defeat the point of forming the
relationship, in addition to adding costs. For example, common law
agents act subject to the principal’s power of control—including the
126. Cross, supra note 11, at 1502.
127. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Advertisement, Is Your Financial Advisor a Fiduciary?,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2020, at A5. In somewhat smaller type, the advertisement states, “Independent registered investment advisors are fiduciaries. Obligated to act in the best interest
of their clients. Continuously. Comprehensively. Completely.” Id. Charles Schwab & Co. itself
provides order-execution, custody, and other non-advisory services for independent advisors.
Through a subsidiary, Schwab is registered as an investment advisor and provides advisory
services to its proprietary mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. See Tamar Frankel,
Charles Schwab in Praise of Independent Fiduciary Advisors, VERDICT (Dec. 6, 2019), https://
verdict.justia.com/2019/12/06/charles-schwab-in-praise-of-fiduciary-independent-advisers
[https://perma.cc/8LMF-FFK9]. For more on the regulatory and legal context, see infra text
accompanying notes 200-03. For one astute observer, it is significant that Schwab chose to
highlight “fiduciary” as a descriptor of a distinct cohort within the world of investment
professionals. See Frankel, supra.
128. Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 261 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
129. Id. at 271.
130. See id.
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power to give interim instructions to the agent—as well as the
principal’s ongoing power to terminate the agent, albeit in breach of
contract.131 Nonetheless “agency is a categorical instance of a fiduciary relationship”; an agent’s fiduciary status reduces potentially
grave risks for the principal that are inherent to the relationship.132
But the point of the relationship is the extension, through the agent,
of the principal’s “legal personality.”133 A principal who sought to
perfectly monitor an agent or to continually exercise control would
defeat the point of engaging an agent. To be sure, agency is atypical
within fiduciary relationships in its hardwired provision of self-help
solutions. As Samuel Bray writes, “the principal tends to be present,
uncowed, and able to assert control.”134 In other fiduciary relationships, a beneficiary more typically remains at the fiduciary’s
mercy.135 Along these lines, writing of contemporary express trusts
in the United States—in which beneficiaries’ interests typically are
discretionary—Thomas Gallanis justifies the presence of stricter
fiduciary rules because beneficiaries “hav[e] to trust” the trustee
“despite the risk of betrayal and harm.”136
Thus, “crowding-out” critiques of the law have no traction when
the law in question focuses on defined types of relationships in
which vulnerable parties, notwithstanding their differences, “have
to trust” the other party. Additionally, as Arthur Laby explains for
investment advisors, attracting a client’s trust can be a calculated
or designed process, leading to a relationship in which the client
reasonably believes the advisor is telling the truth and can be
trusted.137 In one way or another requisite to establishing a practice
in many professions, the process of enlisting trust is not captured by
definitions of trust that focus on affective states entirely arising
from a person’s internal disposition and orientation toward the
131. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 128, at 321, 33435.
132. See id. at 328-29.
133. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 103, at 23, 24.
134. Bray, supra note 113, at 449, 461.
135. See id. at 461 (emphasizing significance of historical role of equity in shaping remedies
in fiduciary fields apart from agency law).
136. Gallanis, supra note 81, at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Laby, supra note 80, at 997, 1002-03.
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world and other people.138 Indeed, if law substitutes for and does not
complement this form of trust, crowding out may be desirable, and
not something to lament, once we take into account the harm
inflicted by disloyal conduct on beneficiaries, however motivated.139
Additionally, fiduciary relationships are not ones in which, by
changing actors’ motives over time, the law interferes with the
meaning and value the actors ascribe to their actions. Emad Atiq
justifies the common law’s refusal to enforce promises to make gifts
by arguing that, over time, enforceability would change the motives
of gift promisors and change the meaning of ultimate compliance
with a gift promise, “crowd[ing] out the norms and motivations that
make gifts valuable.”140 Fiduciary relationships are different. For
starters, the promisee to whom a gift is promised has a bilateral
relationship with the promisor on the basis of which the promisee
may form hopes, not legally enforceable expectations.141 The result
is not a relationship that implicates property the beneficiary owns
or that, like a relationship of common law agency, triggers the
implications of legally consequential representation by another
person. Although the promisee may be confident that the promisor
will fulfill the gift promise, the result is not a “have to trust” relationship of vulnerability. Finally, moving away from promises to
make gifts, the motivations of a person who assumes a fiduciary role
may themselves shift to comply with fiduciary law and regulation—but why assume that which is crowded out is benevolent?
B. Extralegal Sanctions
The distinctiveness of fiduciary law and the functions it serves
are underscored by taking into account the potential force of
extralegal sanctions, including positive and negative reputational
effects. Although extralegal sanctions can be potent ways to deter
138. Larry E. Ribstein, Law & Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2001).
139. As others learn of their prospective vulnerability, both to the same fiduciary and to
others occupying the same role, this benevolent form of crowding out may become a more
generalized effect.
140. Atiq, supra note 5, at 1102-04. Put differently, making a gift promise enforceable
“‘kills’ the gift.” Id. at 1103 (quoting Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 934).
141. See id. at 1102-03.
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and penalize conduct inconsistent with a fiduciary’s assumed role,
whether such sanctions are available heavily depends on context,
while their relative potency is intertwined with law and applicable
regulation. Negative consequences for reputation and their aftermath that follow adverse outcomes in formal legal proceedings can
exemplify the widespread effects of the law’s expressive power. In
contrast, whether reputation is an effective disciplinary mechanism
for commerce in general is open to dispute. The contingency and
fragility of reputation as a mechanism to incentivize rightful
conduct—distinct from the prospect of adverse consequences that
follow errant conduct—underscore the misfit between crowding-out
critiques and fiduciary law.
Whether and how strongly concern for reputation can operate to
constrain conduct also appears to vary with an actor’s role, as illustrated in Hwang’s study of parties to M&A agreements and their
lawyers.142 All were concerned for their reputation within the
bubble-world of a particular deal; only the lawyers cast reputational
concerns more broadly.143 The two concrete examples that follow
begin with a highly visible case within a distinct market context in
which extralegal sanctions may well have exceeded in impact the
damage awards imposed by a court. Much earlier examples within
interconnected premodern markets illustrate that negative reputational consequences did not necessarily follow for perpetrators of
serious fraud, notwithstanding adverse outcomes in formal legal
proceedings.144
When the painter Mark Rothko died in 1970, his estate principally consisted of 798 of his own paintings.145 The estate’s three
executors transferred ownership of the paintings to a commercial
gallery that had worked with Rothko during his lifetime.146 The
same gallery had a contract with one of the executors, a much less
successful painter; another executor served the gallery as a director
and officer.147 The artist’s children and the Attorney General of New
142. Hwang, supra note 59, at 1031, 1042.
143. Id. at 1055.
144. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1977), remanded to 407 N.Y.S.2d 954
(Sur. Ct. 1978).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 294.
147. Id.
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York challenged the terms of the sale as a disposition of estate
assets for grossly inadequate value effected by executors in breach
of fiduciary duty.148 Two executors’ economic ties to the gallery
placed each in an evident conflict of interest, while the third executor acted negligently by going along with the transaction, aware of
his fellow executors’ conflicts.149 The court agreed with the challengers, removing the executors and awarding damages premised on the
paintings’ present market value, or appreciation damages.150 One
legal commentator critical of the decision found the damage awards
“shocking” and likely to impose unjustified costs on honest estate
administrators.151 Another attributed the executors’ predicament to
erroneous legal advice that a court would not entertain a petition for
instructions about the legality of the executors’ proposed conduct.152
The overriding objective of the lawsuit, though, was recovering the
paintings—the defendants’ monetary liability would be reduced for
each painting returned153—which enabled sales and other dispositions over time more likely consistent with Rothko’s wishes,
including the permanent placement of groups of paintings in public
museums.154
These points of dispute aside, the extralegal consequences were,
if anything, worse for the three ousted executors and the gallery
that shared in their disrepute. One executor died a few months after
filing for bankruptcy.155 The not-so-successful artist-executor could
not obtain representation by a top-tier gallery.156 And the gallery’s
position was harmed, the damage to its reputation underscored
when it resigned under pressure from membership in its trade
148. Id. at 293. The Mark Rothko Foundation, a charitable corporation, was a principal
residual beneficiary under Rothko’s will. Id. at 293-94.
149. Id. at 294.
150. Id. at 295, 300 (affirming judgment of Appellate Division, which affirmed judgment
of Surrogate’s Court removing executors and, with one small revision, affirmed Surrogate’s
award of damages).
151. Richard V. Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries—Is Rothko
Right?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 95, 96 (1978).
152. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 963 n.168 (2005).
153. See Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 295.
154. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, A Betrayal the Art World Can’t Forget: The Battle for
Rothko’s Estate Altered Lives and Reputations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at E1.
155. Id. at E4.
156. Id.
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association (the Art Dealers Association of America).157 On the one
hand, this episode exemplifies the potency of extralegal sanctions—
shunning visited on both the disloyal painter-executor and the
complicit gallery—in the wake of formal legal proceedings. On the
other hand, art markets are distinctive in many ways, including the
density and nontransparency of interconnected relationships among
dealers, artists, collectors, auction houses, trade associations, and
art museums.158 Dealers follow well-established customary practices
in interactions with each other and with collectors.159 The market for
visual art is one of the largest contemporary markets not subject to
formal regulation (at least, not much) apart from generally applicable legal principles, which may heighten the importance of extralegal sanctions.160 Nonetheless, although the Rothko executors and
the gallery may have been misinformed about aspects of estateadministration law, it is hard to believe that they were naïve about
the market and the force of reputation within it. The prospect of
extralegal consequences once they came into disrepute did not deter
their breaches of fiduciary duty.
Moving back in time to the salience of reputation in premodern
markets in which interconnections among merchants and their
face-to-face ties could have assigned a prominent role to reputational effects in disciplining market participants, the record of
reputation is contested. As is true at present, in premodern markets
reputation was susceptible to manipulation.161 And reputation was
not necessarily effective as a constraint against small cheats, at

157. Id.
158. On the significance and history of dealers within art markets, see Mark A. Reutter,
Artists, Galleries and the Market: Historical, Economic and Legal Aspects of Artist-Dealer
Relationships, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 103-11 (2001). Scholars often use the metaphor
of an ecosystem to characterize the world of art, with its multiple interlinked components. For
examples and implications, see Deborah A. DeMott, Looking Beyond the Easel: Artists’
Contexts and Resale Payments, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 135, 137 (2020).
159. On customary practices among dealers, see Deborah A. DeMott, Artful Good Faith:
An Essay on Law, Custom, and Intermediaries in Art Markets, 62 DUKE L.J. 607, 631, 638-42
(2012).
160. On the unregulated status of art markets, see Marc Spiegler, The Art Trade Is the Last
Major Unregulated Market, ART NEWSPAPER (June 2005), http://www.marcspiegler.com/
Articles/Artnewspaper/ArtNewspaper-2005-06-MarketReform.htm [https://perma.cc/A49ESV3W].
161. Emily Kadens, The Dark Side of Reputation, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 1997-98 (2019).
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least in part because they were more difficult to detect.162 Focusing
on “the dark side” of reputation, legal historian Emily Kadens uses
court records and merchant correspondence from sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century England to explore the complexities of
reputation.163 Created from rumors and gossip—rarely verified by
market participants—reputation’s openness to manipulation
enabled fraud.164 Public trials of fraudfeasors that resulted in guilty
verdicts did not necessarily doom their businesses.165 Reputational
signals were often mixed because a person with accurate negative
information about another actor might prefer to “hoard” it, sometimes to seek an advantage over others.166 Reputations are fluid;
they respond to new information, which might prove to be false, or
consist of gossip that is hard to interpret or evaluate.167 And, at
some point in trade processes, “each person is forced to take a risk
and trust the other,” a reality that fraudfeasors exploit.168 Historical
studies like these lend no support to a conjecture that reputation
carries greater potential to regulate actors who occupy fiduciary
roles in relationships whose structure means that risks posed for
the other party are often graver than those in merchants’ transactions.
C. The Motive, the Deed, and Acting “As-If”
Whether intrinsic motivations do (or should) matter to fiduciary
law is unsettled among legal scholars. The implications for
“crowding-out” critiques are twofold. First, if there is no necessary
relationship between affective or intrinsic trust and legally enforceable expectations of trustworthy conduct, the prospect that fiduciary law might crowd out intrinsic trust is not salient to legal doctrine
or its application. Second, for actors who assume fiduciary roles,
fiduciary law in operation may, as discussed above, crowd out
motivators that engender harmful conduct when actors either
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Emily Kadens, Cheating Pays, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (2019).
See Kadens, supra note 161, at 1997.
Id.
Id. at 1998.
Id. at 2020.
Id. at 2021, 2023.
Id. at 2023.
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simply comply with the law or internalize signals the law sends.
What remains intriguing is whether it matters how an actor in a
fiduciary role is in fact motivated.
In some accounts—and criminal law aside—the law does not
concern itself with subjective motivation. Most stringently stated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the position is that the law is “wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience” because what
matters is externally observable compliance or noncompliance with
what the law requires.169 For Holmes,
A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is
within the rules. In other words, the standards of the law are
external standards, and, however much it may take moral
considerations into account, it does so only for the purpose of
drawing a line between such bodily motions and rests as it
permits, and such as it does not. What the law really forbids,
and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the
line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise.170

To be sure, Holmes wrote as a scholar of the common law, not
equity, and his claims about the law’s indifference to subjective
motivation (“the internal phenomena of conscience”) may in part
reflect epistemic concerns plus practical challenges of reliable proof
in formal legal proceedings.171 Of course, the latter concern may be
less pressing at present, when text messages, email, tweets, and
other forms of expression and communication can serve as contemporaneous documentation of self-declared motivations and intentions, distinct from inferences to be drawn from actions taken.172
169. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 110 (1923).
170. Id.
171. Id. Famously, Holmes also justified the “reasonable man” standard in negligence law
as one of “general application” that “does not attempt to see men as God sees them.” Id. at
108. This is for several reasons, including the “impossibility of nicely measuring a man’s
powers and limitations,” which is clearer than the impossibility of “ascertaining his knowledge
of law, which has been thought to account for what is called the presumption that every man
knows the law.” Id. For a more recent statement of the same epistemic limitation, see Cross,
supra note 11, at 1468 (“Given our inability to read souls, we may be unable to distinguish
[among] types of trust in many practical applications.”). Put differently, in formal legal
processes as in everyday life, we are not in a position comparable to a novel’s omniscient
narrator who delves into the internal mental states and motivations of fictional characters.
172. See generally Barry Bridges, Text Messages Establish Motive in Murder Case, R.I.
LAWS. WKLY. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://rilawyersweekly.com/blog/2020/01/15/text-messages-

1166

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1137

In any event, when fiduciary law governs a relationship, a
beneficiary’s lack of affective or subjective trust is irrelevant to legal
consequences for an actor who assumed a fiduciary role.173 As Laby
characterizes fiduciary advisory relationships, trust is an essential
component to a relationship in which one party, the advisor, invites
the client to trust that she is telling the truth and will meet her
obligations.174 The social context for the interaction is “one of trust,”
which dominates the “attitudinal response” from any particular
client.175 Likewise, in contemporary express trusts, in which beneficiaries’ interests typically are discretionary and both the trust’s
settlor and the beneficiaries lack ongoing control over the trust’s
assets, Gallanis characterizes the relationship as one “requiring
trust,” in which the “most realistic course of action is to behave as
if one trusts” the trustee.176 What matters, and backstops affective
or intrinsically motivated trust, is the trustee’s legally enforceable
commitment to conduct that complies with duties the law of trusts
imposes.177
In general, for actors who assume fiduciary roles, it is open to
dispute whether conduct that complies with duties of loyalty requires a particular intrinsic motivation. If so, one implication might
be a conflict between intrinsically motivated conduct and conduct
that is externally motivated in response to the law, on the assumption that the presence of mixed motives creates conflicts among
them.178 Stephen Galoob and Ethan Leib advance a compatibility
account of motivation: an action is disloyal “if the actor’s motivations are incompatible with robustly attributing non-derivative
significance to the ... interests or ends” of the object of loyalty.179 As
establish-motive-in-murder-case/ [https://perma.cc/23DX-APJA] (jury determined intent from
text messages sent from the defendant to the victim on the day of the murder).
173. Laby, supra note 80, at 1005; see also Evan J. Criddle, Stakeholder Fiduciaries, in
FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST, supra note 81, at 105, 108 (“[T]he law does not care whether
beneficiaries subjectively trust their fiduciaries.”); Andrew S. Gold, Trust and Advice, in
FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST, supra note 81, at 35, 55 (characterizing trust as not inevitable in
fiduciary relationships and seemingly “an irrelevancy from the legal point of view”).
174. Laby, supra note 80, at 997.
175. Id. at 1001-02.
176. Gallanis, supra note 81, at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
178. See Galoob & Leib, supra note 16, at 44-45.
179. Id. at 53. Writing earlier, Lionel Smith wrote that the essence of fiduciary law lies in
“the surveillance and the justiciability of motive,” drawing on examples from the law of trusts
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opposed to “devotional account[s]” that define action as loyal only
when it is motivated to advance a beneficiary’s interests,180 to
require only that a motivation be compatible with loyalty acknowledges the reality of mixed or multiple motives.181 These could
include compliance with the law and “mundane motives,” such as
earning a commission or generating a positive reputation.182 But for
Galoob and Leib, some motives, when present, suffice “to defeat the
possibility of a loyal action,” whether or not they prompt action,
including “sabotage or betrayal.”183 Their concrete illustrations come
from cases involving defense lawyers in felony proceedings whose
conduct raises concerns about counsel’s motivations in the criminaldefendant’s representation,184 a distinctive context that may limit
the generality of their argument.
Galoob and Leib’s account is attractive because it connects
fiduciary law to loyalty as more generally understood.185 If the law
can have “crowding-in” effects on the intrinsic motivations held by
actors in fiduciary roles, some connection appears necessary.186
Nonetheless, the compatibility account leaves open how noncompatible motives should be defined as a more general matter, apart
from the distinctive jurisprudence associated with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.187 The heterogeneity of fiduciary
relationships, as well as variations in doctrine across relationships,
pose obstacles to generalized definitions of noncompatible motives.
(cases applying the doctrine of fraud on a power) and company law (cases inquiring into
whether directors acted with a proper purpose). Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in
RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 53, 67 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003).
180. Galoob & Leib, supra note 16, at 45.
181. Id. at 54.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Whether counsel’s conduct amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution can implicate counsel’s motives; for example,
otherwise-deficient assistance can be justified by the presence of a “sound strategic motive.”
Galoob & Leib, supra note 16, at 56 (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505
(2003)).
185. Some scholars deny the possibility of a connection between ordinary meanings of
loyalty and fiduciary law. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 213, 220 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2017)
(“[F]iduciary law has nothing to do with loyalty in the ordinary sense of the word.”).
186. Along these lines, the law might “frame” the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship as one
that “calls for a psychological commitment to trustworthy, other-regarding behavior.” Blair
& Stout, supra note 90, at 1743.
187. See Galoob & Leib, supra note 16, at 58-61.
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Consider how “betrayal” might be defined as applied to a conventional fiduciary category, agents. In general, it is not a breach of an
agent’s duties of loyalty to plan to compete with the principal
following termination of the agency relationship, to take concrete
steps toward that end,188 and to do either or both without disclosure
to the principal.189 Once an agency relationship has ended, the nowformer agent owes no duty to the principal to refrain from competing with the principal unless the agent is contractually bound not
to do so.190 An agent’s duties proscribe tactics that can be used to
compete or prepare to compete—in particular, making unconsentedto use of the principal’s confidential information or property—but
what a now-former principal may see as “betrayal” contemporaneous with an agency relationship, or planned “sabotage,” does not
violate the agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal.191 Thus, Galoob
and Leib’s formulation, if generalized across fiduciary relationships,
only partly captures relevant doctrine.
More generally but less ambitiously stated, fiduciary law has an
“as-if ” connection to subjective or intrinsic motivation.192 That is,
actors who assume fiduciary roles—whatever their internal motivations may be—are subject to a mandatory legal constraint that
requires conduct “as if ” they were trustworthy, unconflicted, and
otherwise compliant with fiduciary law. Baseline remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty mirror this constraint.193 The same “as-if ”
quality enables even skeptical beneficiaries to enter a fiduciary
relationship with the law’s assurance notwithstanding doubts they
may harbor about the fiduciary’s motives or prospective conduct or
about their own ability to discern the truth.194 As a consequence, the
law’s “as-if ” relationship to a fiduciary’s subjective or intrinsic motivation may be inevitable, even when plausibly connected to the

188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006).
189. Id. § 8.11. An agent’s duty to disclose material information to the principal does not
require advance warning that the agent will terminate the relationship. See id. § 8.04, cmt. c.
190. Id. § 8.04, cmt.c.
191. Id. § 8.05 & cmt.b.
192. This is not the sense in which the phrase “as if ” is used by characters in the movie
Clueless, Amy Heckerling’s 1995 adaptation of Jane Austen’s Emma. CLUELESS (Paramount
Pictures 1995). In the movie (and not in the novel), “as if ” means something unlikely if not
impossible. Id.
193. See Getzler, supra note 118, at 973-74.
194. See id.
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fiduciary’s breach of duty. Fiduciary law’s “as-if ” properties require
compliant conduct from actors in fiduciary roles, regardless of their
subjective or intrinsic motivations; the same “as-if ” connection to
subjective motivation assures prospective beneficiaries that the law
will backstop them.195
III. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS ON MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
The variety of relationships that are (or potentially might be)
included within the fiduciary realm makes it possible to assess the
persuasiveness of crowding-out critiques along dimensions that
differ among relationships.196 These include whether ties between
the parties precede their fiduciary relationship, the nature of those
ties, the magnitude of the stakes at issue for the party made
vulnerable through the relationship, plus the parties’ reasons for
forming the relationship and its likely duration. Prior ties between
the parties can be consistent with circumstances conducive to the
presence of intrinsic motivations to act in a loyal manner.197 What
the parties already know about each other may enable a prospectively vulnerable party to make an informed choice. Alternatively, looking to the dark side, knowledge and insights gleaned
from prior associations may enable a more efficient choice of prey by
an actor who will prove unworthy of a fiduciary’s role.198 The stakes
involved also carry divergent implications: prospectively vulnerable
parties may be willing to proceed with less care or caution when the
stakes seem low, but accompanying higher stakes are risks of
greater harm when trust is misplaced.199 Arrayed along these
dimensions, relationships to which fiduciary law applies illustrate
its multiple functions. The examples that follow in this Part begin
with relatively high-stakes interactions among parties assumed to
have been relative strangers to each other previously, followed by
lower-stakes interactions among strangers, and concluding with
high-stakes interactions among people already linked by family ties.
195. See id. at 973-75.
196. See FREY, supra note 17, at 96-100.
197. Cf. Gold, supra note 106, at 400 (stating that fiduciary law “is responsive to the
purpose of the relationships in which it figures”).
198. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out, 92 S. CAL.
L. REV. 69, 70-71 (2018).
199. See Blair & Stout, supra note 90, at 1774-75.
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A fundamental—and initial—question is whether a legally mandated duty of loyalty demonstrably shapes conduct.
A. Securities Broker-Dealers, Their Customers, and Investment
Recommendations
It is long settled in the United States that an investment
manager or advisor who is registered as an adviser under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 owes fiduciary duties to her
clients,200 a fact recently underscored and applauded in advertisements from Charles Schwab & Co. discussed in the prior Part.201
More contested is the status of broker-dealer firms and the individual brokers associated with them. The business stakes intensified
when, over time, furnishing advice to customers became more
financially significant for broker-dealers as the costs—and
profit—associated with executing transactions as an agent on behalf
of clients markedly declined.202 Although federal securities law does
not treat brokers as fiduciaries when—unlike registered investment
advisors—they recommend investments to customers, courts in
some—but not all—states have held that broker-dealers and their
broker associates are fiduciaries within state borders.203
This difference among states makes it possible to examine
whether the investment recommendations that brokers give their
clients differ depending on a broker-dealer’s location and its
implications for fiduciary duties. Vivek Bhattacharya and his
coauthors used a data set of transaction-level data for sales of
deferred annuities from a large anonymous provider of financial
200. For the foundational case, see SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963).
201. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
202. SEC, RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE BROKER-DEALER
FIDUCIARY DUTY (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/
fiduciary-duty-recommendation-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/G584-BXBR].
203. For a comprehensive treatment documenting differences among states, see THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.133 (2020). For broader
analytic frameworks, see Kelly, supra note 104, at 8, and Howell E. Jackson & Talia B. Gillis,
Fiduciary Law and Financial Regulation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 851, 86668. An unpublished paper known within the advisory industry details state-by-state contrasts.
See Michael Finke & Thomas Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary 11-15
(Mar. 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2019090 [https://perma.cc/ P2AN-FFH3].
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services, a top-five company by market sales of annuities and
representative of large companies in the industry, combined with
data from Morningstar and the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) relevant to annuity-related investment options.204
The data set included every annuity contract sold by the provider
from 2013-2015, details about the product and individual advisor,
plus limited data for each client.205 The researchers observed the
fiduciary status of the advisor plus detailed geographical information about clients’ and advisors’ locations.206 The study compared
broker-dealers’ behavior in states in which a fiduciary duty was
owed to clients with ones in which it was not, using as a control the
difference in behavior of registered investment advisors.207 Controlling for differences across states, the researchers restricted the
study to counties along borders of states in which the law applicable
to brokers changed.208
The research findings confirm the significance of fiduciary duty
in shaping conduct. When brokers were subject to fiduciary duty
under state law, they sold annuity products with risk-adjusted
investment returns that were twenty-five basis points higher, a
change in returns the researchers attribute to a change in products
sold, away from variable annuities and toward fixed annuities.209
Within the variable-annuity category, the shift was toward products
with more investment options, more highly rated investment options, and investment options with higher historical returns.210 The
study also considered whether the differences resulted from the
presence in a market of brokers who offer higher quality advice,
coupled with the exit of brokers offering lower quality advice, which
would induce the entry of brokers who offer higher quality advice
into previously unprofitable markets.211 Overall, the study’s results
are consistent with finding that “fiduciary duty [acts] as a constraint
204. Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes & Manisha Padi, Fiduciary Duty and the Market
for Financial Advice 16 (May 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3281345 [https://perma.cc/ES3N-BQWP].
205. Id. at 71.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. at 10-11, 10 n.14.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 3-4.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 4-5.
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on low-quality advice” and does not simply increase fixed costs, as
firms enter and leave the relevant markets.212 The results for clients
are investment choices comparable to those that the market would
reward were all customers consistently sophisticated and rational.213
The findings in this study are a baseline illustration of the impact
of fiduciary law relative to other factors that shape conduct,
including reputational effects in markets for investment securities
and advice about investing. In particular, the study demonstrates
that actors’ conduct can respond to the belief that fiduciary law
applies.214 The state-by-state contrasts are striking, in part because
in some states, whether a broker is treated as a fiduciary requires
a factually intense analysis by the court, in contrast with the
categorical determination for registered investment advisers and
other fiduciaries whose status is determined by a formally defined
trigger.215 The study does not reveal the mechanisms through which
brokers came to conform to fiduciary standards in advising their
clients, which might have included firm-level training or industrylevel sources of information and guidance. Although the study does
not assess the overall merits of case-by-case determinations of
fiduciary status as opposed to categorical triggers, it may imply
that—through the operation of some unobserved mechanism—
broker-dealers acted “as if ” they categorically owed fiduciary duties
to advisory clients on the basis of judicial precedents stemming from
fact-intensive case-by-case adjudication.216
More generally, the study’s findings are consistent with understanding fiduciary law as a complement to, and not a substitute for,
other incentives and motivations toward conduct, whether generated through markets or actors’ intrinsic motivations. While
individual advisors may well have ties to their clients that conduce
toward intrinsically motivated loyal conduct, many advisor-client
relationships are closer to what Frey characterized as “impersonal
and purely abstract interactions” positioned toward the end of a
relational spectrum typified by electronic stock markets.217 But
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 7-8.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 45-46.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 2-3, 45-46.
FREY, supra note 17, at x.
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advising necessarily invokes trusting conduct if not subjective or
affective trust in clients, in this study potentially in connection with
high stakes for clients.218 Broker-dealers’ belief that they owe fiduciary duties to clients may or may not operate to reinforce intrinsic
motivations toward loyal conduct, but the impact for clients is
straightforwardly positive.
B. Philanthropic Crowdfunding, Campaign Organizers, and
Their Donors
Investment decisions effected through financial markets combine
investors or prospective investors who—one way or another—seek
economic benefits via transactions that typically require the intervention of an intermediary advisor or agent, whose conduct is
structured by a defined professional role within a complexly regulated and multicomponent industry, as illustrated in the preceding
example. In contrast, donors to philanthropic organizations or
campaigns more likely fit within paradigms dominated by intrinsic
motivation. For some donors, motivations likely represent a mix of
felt desire to help a worthy cause or institution, an interest in
enhancing self-regard and reputation in others’ eyes, as well as
extrinsic motivations of the sort created by tax incentives.219
Likewise, individuals associated with organizations that solicit
donations to charity often act from a mix of motives, including
earning an income. In the United States, philanthropic organizations that qualify for favorable federal tax treatment for the
organization and its donors are subject to a web of regulation that,
through disclosure and public filing requirements, can operate to
reveal and discourage problematic conduct.220
Against this relatively settled backdrop, the introduction of
platform-based crowdfunding, which enables individuals to initiate
wide-reaching campaigns for charitable objectives, raises issues that
remain unresolved in the United States.221 Chief among them are
218. Laby, supra note 80, at 997.
219. See, e.g., Tax-Deductible Donation, GOFUNDME, https://support.gofundme.com/hc/enus/articles/360039267752-Tax-Deductible-Donation [https://perma.cc/3STY-KFQV].
220. For some specifics, see RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS.
§ 5.03 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2019).
221. Beyond the scope of this Article, crowdfunding raises tax questions, including whether
crowdfunding contributions should be treated as gross income to the organizer, whether the
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the legal status of a campaign’s organizer and the treatment of
funds received through the campaign that are not turned over to a
conventional charitable organization.222 Paradigmatically, identifiable individuals or community groups organize charitable campaigns for benevolent or humanitarian purposes tied by locale to the
organizers; platform-based fundraising harnesses the internet to
amass widespread public support to assist deserving individuals or
causes, independent of community-based ties or geographic proximity.223 In Canada, beginning in 2011, informal public appeals are
addressed by provincial legislation sparked by a uniform act
launched in 2009 by the Civil Section of the Uniform Law Commission of Canada (the UCLC).224 In 2019, the UCLC circulated a
proposed revision that encompasses platform-enabled philanthropic
crowdfunding within the same overall statutory structure.225 In the
United States, the Uniform Law Commission (the ULC) has begun
work on a counterpart uniform act. Its key provisions noticeably
depart from the Canadian approach,226 as explained below.
Donors to philanthropic campaigns conducted via GoFundMe or
another platform or via Facebook or other internet-facilitated
possibilities often lack prior ties to the campaign’s organizer.227 A
campaign combines the philanthropic motivations of donors with the
motivations of campaign organizers, which may be hard for donors
to discern. If the organizer misuses donated funds by putting them
organizer may take a charitable deduction after donating the funds, and so forth. See Andrew
M. Wasilick, The Tax Implications of Crowdfunding: From Income to Deductions, 97 N.C. L.
REV. 710, 711-12, 714-15 (2019).
222. See id.
223. UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS AND CROWDFUNDING ACT pt. I (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN.,
Consultation Paper 2019), http://unilaw.ca/data/documents/Consultation-Paper-2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/UAD5-BMNU].
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. For a detailed examination of the Canadian approach to fiduciary relationships in
philanthropic crowdfunding campaigns, see Karen E. Boxx, A New Member of the Fiduciary
Family: Crowdfunding Campaign Organizers (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the William & Mary Law Review).
227. GoFundMe itself charges no “platform fee.” Everything You Need to Know About
GoFundMe’s Fees, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/c/blog/gofundme-fees#:~:text=
%E2%80%9C%20or%20%E2%80%9CHow%20much%20does%20GoFundMe,can%20help%
20even%20more%20peopleunilaw.ca/data/documents/Consultation-Paper-2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZJ99-FJE3]. It provides an opportunity to organizers to make a donation to
the organization and charges a per-transaction fee of 2.9 percent plus thirty cents for credit
and debit card transactions. Id.
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to a self-interested use or another use beyond the terms of the
campaign, donors suffer direct harm because they intended to
benefit the object of the campaign.228 A crowdfunding platform may
mitigate this harm by providing refunds under some circumstances.229 If an organizer’s misuse of funds becomes generally
known (even when the platform makes refunds to donors who seek
them), a less direct and more diffuse type of harm may follow
because the campaign’s donors have a new basis for skepticism
about giving in response to future appeals, whoever the organizer
might be. In the past, scandals associated with particular charitable
organizations were followed by declines in giving to the organization, notwithstanding ongoing demand for the services it provided.230
More generally, donors who learn they have been duped by
placing trust in an organizer who proved unworthy may look
askance at requests for charity in the future because the deep-set
intrinsic fear of being a sucker has been evoked.231 An additional
concern over time is the impact on the proportion of campaign
organizers who are “dishonest types,” drawn to opportunities to
exploit the benevolent impulses of others.232 Fiduciary law, by
assuaging donors’ doubts and providing public recourse, could
undergird donors’ willingness to act on their intrinsic motivations
toward philantropy.233 On the other hand, legal interventions—
beyond the terms imposed by a crowdfunding platform or the terms
of a campaign—could deter prospective organizers through the
introduction of legal formalities.234
228. See, e.g., Charges: Richfield Woman Stole over $2,000 from GoFundMe Account, FOX9
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.fox9.com/news/charges-richfield-woman-stole-over-2000-fromgofundme-account [https://perma.cc/GHJ5-EN9Q] (reporting that an organizer collected
$2,645 raised from a campaign whose donors believed would benefit a grieving family).
229. GoFundMe will refund the amount of contributions when they are not delivered to the
intended beneficiary or when a campaign’s organizer or beneficiary has misled donors, up to
$1000 per donor per campaign. For details, see The GoFundMe Guarantee, GOFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/c/safety/gofundme-guarantee [https://perma.cc/K8HJ-DBMA].
230. Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 131, 134 (1993).
231. On the fear, see Bowles, supra note 48, at 1609. For the phenomenon of “looking
askance,” see MICHAEL LEJA, LOOKING ASKANCE 12-13, 20 (2004). As Leja describes its origins,
“adjusting to modern life in New York [from] 1900 [onward] meant learning to see skeptically
... to process visual experiences with some measure of suspicion, caution, and guile.” Id. at 1.
232. For this terminology, see Bohnet et al., supra note 38, at 136.
233. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 122, 125 and accompanying text.
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Under the Canadian Act, a campaign organizer who directs the
management and disbursement of a fund or has authority to do so
is defined to be a trustee.235 Although many of the Act’s provisions
are default terms that may be varied by the terms of a public
appeal, the definition of “trustee” is not among them.236 This
mandatory statutory definition is consistent with the general legal
definition of a “trust” as
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a
manifestation of intention to create that relationship and
subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to
deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons,
at least one of whom is not the sole trustee.237

It follows from this definition that not all benevolence is “charitable”
in the legal sense; property held on behalf of identified persons is
not held for the benefit of “charity” but is held in trust on behalf of
“one or more” identified persons or an identified class of persons.238
A trustee is “[t]he person who holds property in trust.”239 The
Canadian Act specifies the organizer’s duties as trustee. These
duties include using the fund’s income and capital for the fund’s
object and considering at least annually whether any remaining
money or property is still needed.240 When a campaign generates a
surplus, the result is not a trust in favor of donors.241 The terms of
a campaign or trust instrument may specify how to distribute a
surplus. According to the Canadian Act, court approval is not
required if the terms are consistent with “the spirit of the appeal,”
including distribution to a charitable object if consistent with the

235. UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS ACT § 4(1) (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN. 2012).
236. Id. § 2(3)(a).
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
238. A charitable trust requires a purpose focused on public, not private benefit, concerned
with a “social interest” or “benefit to the community.” Id. § 28 cmt. a.
239. Id. § 3(3).
240. UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS ACT § 24 (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN. 2012).
241. Id. § 10(1). GoFundMe permits organizers to continue fundraising once a campaign
reaches its goal, with progress reflected on a meter displayed for each campaign. An organizer
may “edit” the terms of a campaign to increase its goal. GoFundMe’s website recommends
explaining why a goal amount has been increased. See Editing Your Fundraiser, GOFUNDME
https://support.gofundme.com/hc/en-us/articles/360001992687 [https://perma.cc/G8SA-N78J].
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spirit of the campaign.242 The Canadian Act grants standing to
enforce the trust to a trustee, a person or member of a class for
whose benefit the campaign was conducted, the Attorney General,
or a donor or any other person with a sufficient interest as determined by the court.243
In contrast, the Draft Uniform Act in the United States does not
use the word “trustee.”244 The drafters considered characterizing a
campaign organizer as a trustee when the object of the campaign
was an incapacitated person or a minor but feared making the end
product “unenactable” by state legislatures.245 Reportedly, the
drafters were also concerned about providing sufficient notice to
campaign organizers of their legal status,246 a concern that could be
mitigated for organizers of crowdfunding campaigns if the platform
were to provide notice.
Nor does the Draft Act use the word “fiduciary.”247 The Draft Act
imposes duties on fund organizers. For example, they must distribute funds consistently with the terms of the appeal and hold the
funds in a regulated financial institution un-commingled with their
own funds.248 The Act also limits organizers’ liability to losses
caused by dishonesty or willful misconduct.249 Under the Draft Act,
donors do not have standing to sue.250 De facto, Karen Boxx argues,
the Draft Act creates “a new category of fiduciary, with minimal
duties” and one constrained by fewer potential resources for
enforcement because donors would lack standing to sue.251 The position of donors who typically are unable to monitor how the organizer
uses funds would warrant stricter fiduciary duties. But how would
organizers receive sufficient notice of the legal implications of what
242. See UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS ACT § 10(2), (5)(b) (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN. 2012).
243. See UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS AND CROWDFUNDING ACT § 8 (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN.,
Consultation Paper 2019), https://unilaw.ca/data/documents/Consultation-Paper-2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/UAD5-BMNU].
244. See FUNDRAISING THROUGH PUB. APPEALS ACT §§ 5, 10, cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE L., Draft June 6, 2019).
245. Boxx, supra note 226, at 9.
246. Id.
247. See FUNDRAISING THROUGH PUB. APPEALS ACT § 10, cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L., Draft June 6, 2019).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 10(a),(f), cmt.
250. Id. § 12, cmt.
251. Boxx, supra note 226, at 9.
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they have undertaken, which go beyond the general legal obligation
not to commit fraud?252 To be sure, the Draft Act could assign
responsibility to provide notice to crowdfunding campaign platforms, but this possible route toward notice would not apply when
an organizer proceeds with an appeal but does not use a platform.
Characterizing the organizer of a crowdfunding campaign as a
trustee, as does the Canadian Act, is an example of the “channeling”
function served by fiduciary law, discussed above.253 Both the Draft
Act in the United States and the Canadian Act expressly do not
apply to appeals by organized charities or to funds payable to or
paid over to an organized charity.254 If a crowdfunding campaign has
a charitable “object”—not one directed toward specific individuals—
an organizer is not deemed to be a trustee under the Canadian
Act.255 Similarly, an organizer is not a de facto fiduciary under the
Draft Act in the United States if funds raised by the campaign will
go directly to, or will be paid over to, an organized charity.256 This
exception places ownership of the funds within a regulated organization, as discussed above, and allays concerns the organizer might
otherwise have about assuming the status of a trustee or fiduciary
(assuming the organizer is made aware of those consequences, as a
crowdfunding platform could do). To be sure, when the object of a
campaign is particular needy individuals, the object is not “charitable” in the legal sense;257 channeling toward a regulated charity is
not an option unless the campaign’s object is broadened.
Whether designating campaign organizers as trustees has the
effect of channeling campaigns toward organized charities could be
a testable empirical question and more than a theoretical conjecture, given the availability of almost a decade of experience under
252. See id. at 11.
253. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
254. FUNDRAISING THROUGH PUB. APPEALS ACT § 4 (1), (3), cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE L., Draft June 6, 2019); UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS AND CROWDFUNDING
ACT § 2(2)(a), (b) (UNIF. L. CONF. CAN., Consultation Paper 2019), http://unilaw.ca/data/
documents/Consultation-Paper-2019.htm [https://perma.cc/UAD5-BMNU].
255. UNIF. INFORMAL PUB. APPEALS AND CROWDFUNDING ACT §§ 1, 4(1) (UNIF. L. CONF.
CAN., Consultation Paper 2019), http://unilaw.ca/data/documents/Consultation-Paper2019.htm [https://perma.cc/UAD5-BMNU].
256. FUNDRAISING THROUGH PUB. APPEALS ACT § 8, cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L., Draft June 6, 2019).
257. See RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 1.01 (AM. L. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2019).
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the Canadian Act. Experience with organized charities in the
United States over a somewhat longer period of time suggests an
additional possibility toward allaying concerns by and on behalf of
donors.258 At least for large tax-exempt charitable organizations, the
public availability of a rich body of information generated by
mandatory tax filings has enabled deep-reaching scrutiny into
organizations’ conduct and efficacy.259 Making the phenomenon of
crowdfunding and its individual campaign organizers more transparent to prospective donors through readily accessible data—
perhaps assembled by platforms or other hosts with organizers’
consent, and amenable to analysis by third parties—could mitigate
concerns that stem from prospective donors’ lack of information
about campaign organizers and inability to monitor their use of
funds.
Gifts to organized charities also mitigate issues stemming from
charitable campaigns that succeed to a degree beyond the organizers’ and donors’ likely expectations. Following catastrophic wildfires
in Australia in 2019 and 2020, celebrities and others organized
appeals to support firefighters; one campaign conducted via
Facebook raised $34 million.260 “Flush” with tens of millions of
dollars from that campaign and other sources, the New South Wales
Rural Fire Service could support itself for decades, while it is
unclear that individual donors fully realized their contributions
258. See, e.g., David C. Hammack, Nonprofit Organizations in American History, 45 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1638, 1640 (2002).
259. For the history, see RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 5.03,
cmt. b. (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2019). Publicly accessible information concerning
charities has enabled the work of nongovernmental organizations such as Charity Navigator,
which rates charities and provides easily searchible information about individual charities.
See About Us, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=
content.view&cpid=1653 [https://perma.cc/M455-J6N4]. Publicly available information
facilitates journalistic scrutiny of the charitable sector. For an example, see Joe Stephens &
Mary Pat Flaherty, Inside the Hidden World of Thefts, Scams and Phantom Purchases at the
Nation’s Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/inside-the-hidden-world-of-thefts-scams-and-phantom-purchases-at-thenations-nonprofits/2013/10/26/825a82ca-0c26-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6G9W-HY4Y]. It also furnishes reliable data for quantitative inquiry. For
a recent example, see Erica Harris, Christine M. Petrovits & Michelle H. Yetman, The Effect
of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990, 90 ACCT. REV.
579, 580, 582-83 (2015).
260. Isabella Kwai, Donations Are Pouring into Australia. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/world/australia/fires-donations-help.html?
searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/6KXC-P7GA].
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would go to a single fire service.261 Likely the Fire Service—and not
the celebrity who organized the Facebook campaign—has discretion
whether to distribute money to other organizations, which individual donors may not have contemplated.262 In contrast, donations to
organized charities focused on disaster relief facilitate that end in
a more transparent and efficient manner.263 To be sure, that
institutional route toward charity may carry less pizzazz than
platform-based and Facebook-facilitated campaigns. It may be less
compelling to campaign organizers, whether or not celebrities, as a
route toward self-redefinition and potential prominence. Nonetheless, clarifying organizers’ fiduciary status would reduce risks for
both campaign donors and organizers.
C. The Family Trust and the Conflicted Trustee
Intrinsic motivations to trust and to prove worthy of being trusted
seem more likely when the parties to a relationship are linked by
family ties, not just acquainted with each other.264 In some recurrent
situations in which a person in a fiduciary role proceeds in the face
of a structural conflict—one embedded in the situation that cannot
be avoided—intrinsic motivation toward loyal conduct serves a selfevidently important function, as does fiduciary law. The relationship between the two merits exploration. Some common situations
pose structural conflicts that are intrinsic to a situation and not
created by a fiduciary. One in particular arises when a family
member serves as the trustee of a trust created by another family
member, when the trustee is also a life or remainder beneficiary of
the trust. The beneficiary-trustee’s position is conflicted, but the
conflict was created by the trust’s settlor, who chose the trustee.
Among settled fiduciary categories, trust law casts a trustee’s
fiduciary duties in especially rigorous terms, in particular the duty
of loyalty. Undivided loyalty is required from a trustee, who must
administer the trust solely in the beneficiaries’ interest.265 And a
trustee is “strictly prohibited” from engaging in self-dealing or
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. L. INST. 2005).

2021]

THE DOMAINS OF LOYALTY

1181

otherwise creating a conflict between the trustee’s personal
interests and fiduciary duties.266 The “no further inquiry” rule,
discussed above, reinforces those obligations by foreclosing judicial
examination of the trustee’s subjective motives or the substantive
outcome wrought by the breach.267 The rationale for the rule,
observes the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, “begins with a recognition that it may be difficult for a trustee to resist temptation when
personal interests conflict with fiduciary duty.”268 Relatedly, a
trustee’s misconduct may easily be concealed.269 At the same time,
as Robert Sitkoff characterizes it, trust law recognizes a trust
settlor’s freedom of disposition and accords great weight to the
terms of the trust.270 As a consequence, “most fiduciary principles in
trust law are default rules that may be varied by the terms of the
trust.”271 By naming a beneficiary of a trust as sole trustee or
cotrustee, the settlor has varied the applicability of the rules
canvassed above.272 The settlor has created a structural conflict in
the face of which the trustee must administer the trust. Although
the trustee may succeed in applying to the court for instructions, the
trustee would commit a breach of the duty to administer the trust
by failing to act.273 Having accepted the role of trustee, a trustee’s
resignation, if in accord with the terms of the trust, requires the
court’s approval or consent from all beneficiaries.274
Although trust law is clear that a trustee’s fiduciary duty of
loyalty survives in some form, notwithstanding a structural conflict
created by the settlor, the law furnishes little concrete guidance to
a conflicted trustee. Consider a trust established by Father (F) with
a life interest to Spouse (S) and a remainder interest to Child (C).
The trust names C as sole trustee and gives C discretionary power
266. Id. § 78(2).
267. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2005). Thus, the law’s
preference is “to remove altogether the occasions of temptation rather than to monitor
fiduciary behavior and attempt to uncover and punish abuses when a trustee has actually
succumbed to temptation.” Id.
269. Id.
270. Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 103, at 41, 60.
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 71, 76 (AM. L. INST. 2005).
274. Id. § 36.
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to invade the corpus of the trust for current distribution. To the
extent C exercises discretion to benefit S, C may well diminish the
value of C’s own remainder interest. If C is stingy toward S, C may
augment the value of C’s remainder interest. Depending on S’s other
resources, C may deprive S contrary to C’s nonlegal filial obligations
toward a parent through self-serving conduct that might disappoint
F, were he still alive.
To be sure, despite the settlor-created structural conflict in this
common situation, trust law subjects a trustee in C’s position to a
duty of impartiality that requires giving “due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective interests as defined by the settlor.”275 The duty of
impartiality can be ambivalent in application. On the one hand, the
settlor’s choice of a beneficiary-trustee like C could be a basis on
which to infer some preference for C or confidence in C’s judgment.
On the other hand, although in general impartiality is assessed by
whether a trustee acted reasonably, a conflicted trustee’s decisions
attract “close scrutiny” for abuse or inadequate regard for the duty
of impartiality.276
This simple example illustrates complexities inherent in the law’s
role in a recurrent situation in which it is likely that the trustee’s
actions would be consistent with strongly felt inherent motivation
to act in a trustworthy fashion when making decisions that affect
the interests of a close family member. The history of the relationship between the settlor and the trustee could warrant the settlor’s
confidence in the trustee.277 But this recurrent situation can also be
characterized by the presence of hard-to-detect abuse and uncertain
prospects for an eventual legal reckoning.278
These dilemmas aside, the impact of the law is not consistent
with crowding-out critiques because duties imposed by trust law
complement and do not suppress a conflicted trustee’s intrinsic
motivations toward loyal conduct.279 Rather, the law’s impact on

275. Sitkoff, supra note 270, at 52; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. L. INST.
2005); see also Criddle, supra note 173, at 123 (characterizing a settlor-appointed beneficiary
trustee as an example of a stakeholder fiduciary who is subject to an expectation that other
beneficiaries will be treated equitably relative to the purposes of the trust).
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. (b)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2005).
277. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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intrinsic motivation depends on crowding-in effects.280 Just as the
basic rationale for the “no further inquiry” rule relies on the insight
that resisting temptation can be difficult in order to justify removing
predictable occasions that can tempt trustees toward disloyalty,281
the abiding presence of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in structuralconflict situations recognizes that the law may stiffen a trustee’s
spine through a reminder that the settlor conferred discretion on the
trustee coupled with duties toward other beneficiaries.282 In simpler
terms, creating a trust with a structural conflict is not the same as
making an outright present gift to the trustee or promising one in
the future, perhaps via a provision in a will.283 Fiduciary law in this
example serves to remind the conflicted trustee that to some
extent—and to what extent remains unspecified—a trustee always
occupies an other-regarding role that the law takes seriously. The
law channels trustees who are subject to structural conflicts into a
fiduciary category and not a category that permits the unconstrained pursuit of self-interest.
Varying the initial example, suppose the trustee chosen by F as
settlor is not F’s child but a commercial trust company. That alters
many (but not all) dimensions of the parties’ relationship. F’s trust
will be administered by an individual trust officer employed or
otherwise associated with the trust company and subject to the
terms of a trust instrument, in which F may consent to conflicts,
such as the trust company’s investment of trust assets in affiliated
entities. Prior ties may or may not link the trust company and the
trust officer to the settlor. Unlike C, an individual trustee-beneficiary, the trust company and its trust officer occupy well-defined
professional roles.
The professional nature of the services provided by these
fiduciaries is not inconsistent with loyal action; professionalization
itself may serve to orient actors toward the implications of assuming
a fiduciary role.284 Commercial trustees and individual trust officers
may well be motivated by intrinsic commitments to loyalty toward
clients, which can be enhanced by training and role-orientation. In
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265, 275 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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this respect, they resemble the broker-dealers and their associated
brokers discussed earlier in this Section.285 However, the commercial trust company and its trust officer occupy roles that conventionally trigger fiduciary status,286 unlike the broker-dealers who gave
investment advice consistent with a fiduciary mandate notwithstanding issues about its meaning and applicability.287 In both cases,
fiduciary law serves the distinct function of hedging against the risk
of ill-motivated actors.288 And occupying a professional role—along
with training and appropriate role-orientation—may be no less
likely to strengthen fiduciary loyalty than a family affiliation.
For trustees—whether family members or professionals situated
within commercial service providers—fiduciary law furnishes a
backdrop normative standard that abides notwithstanding provisions in trust instruments consenting to conflicts or structural
conflicts created by a settlor.289 Admittedly, to establish that this
backdrop standard shapes conduct—comparable to the demonstrated impact on broker-dealers who sell annuities while believing
themselves to be subject to fiduciary duties290—may fall beyond the
reach of quantitative empirical study. But the backdrop standard
applicable to conflicted trustees appears no less likely to shape
conduct than state fiduciary law applicable to broker-dealers. The
backdrop fiduciary standard guides trustees’ conduct whether it
operates through the force of extrinsic motivation induced by the
law or through more nuanced relationships among the law, extralegal constraints, and the intrinsic motivations of individuals and
business firms that assume fiduciary roles.
CONCLUSION
Crowding-out effects are not persuasive as critiques of fiduciary
law given its distinctive functions, which are grounded in qualities
of the relationships to which fiduciary law applies. Exploring why
this is so helps identify characteristics within fiduciary law that
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265-68, 275 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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lend overall coherence to the subject as general points of unification
across widely divergent relationships. Through their structure,
these are “have to trust” relationships in which betrayal by the
party in whom trust is reposed always remains a possibility. The
three case studies that conclude this Article illustrate the potential
for complex relationships between the law and intrinsic motivation.
Even when parties have prior ties that enhance the likelihood that
trust will not be betrayed once it is reposed, fiduciary law as
exemplified in the law of trusts underscores the meaning of a
trustee’s role. When the parties are not as likely to have such ties,
fiduciary law backstops constraints on problematic behavior that
can stem from market-generated signals and reputational effects.
By informing actors of what is required, fiduciary law also furnishes
reassurance to actors who assume roles in which others repose trust
in them.

